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Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment 
Abstract 
The subject of this study was the Resistencia Nacional Moc;ambicana (Renamo) 
movement, its involvement in the Mozambican civil war, and the way in which 
Renamo was presented to the outside world. 
Renamo began fighting against the Marxist Frelimo government in Mozambique in 
1977, receiving limited Rhodesian and subsequently South African assistance. 
Renamo was the subject of an almost unprecedented propaganda war, and labelled a 
foreign proxy. The work examines the shortcomings of media and academic coverage 
of the Mozambican civil war in general and Renamo in particular. 
The study attempts to explain the ·silccess· of the Renamo insurgency, suggesting that 
much of Renamo' s support was the result of ingrained rural and regional opposition to 
the Frelimo government. The study traces the intellectual origins of Renamo back to 
Frelimo itself, examining how Frelimo had earlier been split between Marxist and 
nationalist tendencies. 
The study examines how Frelimo managed to portray Renamo as a terrorist 
organisation without popular support, contrasting this image with the markedly 
different first-hand observations of over twenty independent visitors to Renamo-
controlled parts of Mozambique. 
The study examines how it was possible for virtually every branch of informed 
opinion to have misjudged the forces at play within the Mozambican civil war. The 
work argues that Renamo was a genuinely Mozambican phenomena and should be 
seen as having enjoyed considerably more popular support than had hitherto been 
accepted. Much of the thesis outlined in the work was borne out by both the 1994 and 
1999 election results, in which Renamo won 112 and 117 out of 250 Parliamentary 
seats. 
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The history of Mozambique from 1962 until 1992 was one of intense political conflict 
coupled with virtually non-stop guerrilla warfare. There have been two long-standing 
guerrilla wars fought within Mozambique since 1964. The first was initiated and 
directed by Mozambican nationalists grouped within the Frente de Liberta9iio de 
M09ambique (Mozambique Liberation Front or Fre1imo). This was fought from 1964 
onwards in opposition to the Portuguese colonial authority within Mozambique, and 
ceased some months after the April 1974 coup d'etat in Portugal, which brought to 
power an administration committed to the decolonisation of Portugal's overseas 
possessions. This policy led to negotiations which saw Frelimo handed political 
power within Mozambique by the Portuguese government on 26 June 1975. The 
second insurgency within Mozambique was that fought by the Resistencia Nacional 
MOf;ambicana (Mozambique National Resistance or Renamo). This was directed 
against the post-independence Frelimo government and its policies. This conflict was 
fought from 1977 onwards and saw the military involvement of several of 
Mozambique's neighbours. The Zimbabwean, Tanzanian, Zambian and Malawian 
governments all deployed military formations at various times during the conflict in 
support of the Frelimo government and against Renamo forces. 
Renamo's insurgency can be said to have been successful in as much as it forced the 
Mozambican government to the negotiating table, and to accept a multi-party system 
of government in Mozambique. A cease-fire, negotiated by the Italian government 
and the Vatican-based St Egidio religious community, ended the Mozambican civil 
war in 1992. This cease-fire was then followed by a two year United Nations-
supervised transitional period which culminated in 1994 with internationally-
supervised multi-party elections, the first in Mozambique's history. 
It is a matter of record that throughout the course of the second Mozambican civil 
war, the general perception of the Resistencia Nacional Moc;ambicana internationally 
was a very negative one. The standard projection of Renamo was that it was an 
organisation that was nothing more or less than a Rhodesian and South African 
creation and creature divorced from, and alien to, Mozambique and Mozambicans. 
Additionally, it was claimed that it was a terrorist organisation made up of "armed 
bandits" which lacked either a political constituency or geographical base. l The 
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standard Frelimo line unhesitatingly pressed for a military solution, and was unable to 
concede any thought of a negotiated settlement of the situation. 
The work submitted in this application, Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: A 
Case for Reassessment, was the first systematic re-evaluation both of the causes and 
dynamics of the second Mozambican civil war, and the Resistencia Nacional 
Mor;ambicana. It was the first detailed assessment of the many negative claims made 
about this organisation. It built on two other works: Mozambique: A Nation in 
Crisis, a previous book I had written which had been published in 1989, which cast a 
critical eye of what was seen at the time as "accepted wisdom" with regard to 
Mozambique; and on Mozambique: Propaganda, Myth and Reality, a monograph 
published in 1991.2 I had been able to travel for thousands of kilometres across 
Renamo-held areas of Mozambique both during the civil war and into the partial, and 
then general, cease-fire periods. What I had seen did not match what I had read about 
Renamo in the generally accepted literature. The study thus sought to present an 
alternative perspective on Renamo, one which explored the view that far from being a 
foreign invention, Renamo had in effect emerged from, and it could be argued was the 
political heir to, the Mozambican nationalism that had originally shaped both Frelimo 
and Frelimo's political orientation. Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: A Case 
for Reassessment presented the view that Renamo could also be seen as being 
particularly close, and responsive, to a considerable section of Mozambique's largely 
rural population, a population that had become increasingly alienated by government 
policies. The work also examined why it was that Renamo came to be as 
internationally isolated, misunderstood and misrepresented during, and even after, the 
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Mozambican civil war. Largely written in 1992 and 1993, it was published m 
February 1994 - several months before the October 1994 mUlti-party election m 
Mozambique. This election was informative in that for the first time ever, and in 
electoral terms which could not be disputed, it demonstrated the extent of the support 
for Renamo within Mozambique. In so doing, it undermined a considerable body of 
generally accepted work claiming the opposite. 
Even before the 1994 elections, my book was able to compare and contrast academic, 
media, Mozambican government and related claims about Renamo with the reality of 
the situation in Mozambique as the country opened up to outside observers during the 
two year transitional period supervised by the United Nations prior to the elections. 
Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment outlined for the 
first time, and in some detail, the academic, non-governmental organisational, media 
and solidarity network and its generally supportive attitude towards the Frelimo 
government, and the reasons for that support. Central to the work was chapter three, 
'Propaganda, Myth and Reality'.3 This chapter was the first systematic study of both 
the propaganda used against Renamo during the Mozambican civil war, as well as the 
international structures which echoed and disseminated the Mozambican 
government's standard projection of Rena mo. 
Any study of Renamo, and assessments of its political nature, composition, and 
constituency during the Mozambican civil war, however, was made difficult for many 
reasons. A major limitation of this study at the time was that anything to do with 
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Renamo was surrounded by considerable propaganda and disinformation.4 Eight 
years after the end of hostilities, and five years after the 1994 multi-party election, 
there is still a considerable amount of secrecy surrounding the recent conflict, and the 
exact nature of the full military involvement of Mozambique's neighbouring states 
such as South Africa and Zimbabwe. 
A significant limitation of any work on Renamo was that much of the academic study 
of the 1977-92 insurgency had been shaped by academics and commentators who 
were either ideologically committed to, or publicly sympathetic with, the parties 
involved. There was also very little opportunity for field studies by academics, who 
were then reliant on previously published sources - which, in most cases, were clearly 
propagandistic and ultimately of little value, save that of providing examples of 
propaganda to analyse and assess in their own right. Very little of record per se had 
been written on the 1977-1992 insurgency at the time of the writing of Mozambique, 
Resistance and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment - and very little since. 
A related and equally significant problem was that media coverage of the 
Mozambican civil war, and Renamo's role within it, had been disjointed by the 
obvious limitations placed upon media outlets and journalists by the respective sides 
to the conflict. It was also constrained by the nature of guerrilla war itself. Much the 
same could be said about attempts to comment on events within Mozambique from a 
human rights perspective Additionally, there are serious doubts over the objectivity of 
some of the media coverage, particularly that concerning the Renamo insurgency, 
given the political sympathies of several key correspondents. The fact that both the 
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Reuters and Agence France Presse correspondents in Mozambique were full-time 
employees of the Mozambican government's news agencies, as well as self-evident 
political supporters of the government, is a case in point. Much the same observation 
could also be made with regard to the stance of most, if not all, the non-governmental 
organisations active in Mozambique - and particularly their respective head-offices 
outside of the country. 
Accompanying all these difficulties was the fact that Renamo did not adequately 
document its history, perspectives, position or structures. 
Renamo's Political Roots in Frelimo 
Given the clear and quite successful attempts by the Mozambican government to write 
in effect the history of the Resistencia Nacional Mor;ambicana, and given Renamo's 
claim to have assumed the mantle of Mozambican nationalism as originally embraced 
by Frelimo, Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment 
explored in detail both the origins, and subsequent history, of the Frente de 
Libertar;iio de Mor;ambique. 
Frelimo had been fonned in 1962 in exile in Tanzania out of three Mozambican 
nationalist groups. Over the next few years a power struggle then unfolded between 
the older generation of African nationalists and a younger generation of activists 
whose political orientation was Marxist. As Frelimo's political and military struggle 
against the Portuguese intensified so did the internal power struggle within the 
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movement. The assassination of Frelimo' s founding president sharpened the conflict. 
The younger Marxist group succeeded in gaining control of Frelimo's political and 
military structures. From Frelimo's own in-house histories Mozambique, Resistance 
and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment demonstrated that the struggle within 
Frelimo had clearly been along political lines, with one group adhering to a black 
nationalist, small 'c' conservative perspective, which had more in common with 
Kenyan nationalist parties such as KANU, and the other being Marxists who followed 
a "progressive and revolutionary line". 
Many nationalists within Frelimo who during and after the power struggle had come 
into conflict with the Marxist grouping left the movement when the grouping gained 
an ascendancy and formed or joined other Mozambican nationalist organisations. 
During the transitional period in Mozambique between the cease-fire in 1974 and the 
Portuguese hand over of power to Frelimo in 1975, there had been an expectation of 
some sort of election. A number of black political parties and organisations came into 
being, some of them led by figures who had been prominent in Frelimo before leaving 
as a result of the internecine struggles. The Portuguese chose to hand over power to 
Frelimo without holding any elections in Mozambique. Once in power it is a matter of 
record that Frelimo crushed its political opposition. In the 1990s, the government 
admitted, for example, that many of the key leaders of opposition to Frelimo in 
Mozambique were murdered in the mid-to-Iate 1970s.5 
In the work submitted, it was argued that it was out of black Mozambican nationalist 
and political opposition to Frelimo that Resistencia Nacional MOyambicana emerged, 
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particularly in the wake of the post-independence repression in Mozambique. Both of 
its presidents had been Frelimo members, and Renamo claimed that it represented the 
original black nationalist tendency within Frelimo which had come into conflict with 
the Marxist grouping that ultimately seized control of that organisation. Interestingly, 
prominent Frelimo party historians stated that Frelimo leaders also traced Renamo's 
roots back to the foundation of Frelimo in 1962. It is also clear that Renamo did 
receive Rhodesian and then South African support when these governments came into 
conflict with the Mozambican government. 
Renamo Success and Support within Mozambique during the Civil War 
As outlined in the study, the Resistencia Nacional M09ambicana came to face 
considerable odds during its fifteen year-long insurgency. An organisation that grew 
from under one thousand men and women in 1979, it numbered twenty thousand 
lightly armed members ten years later. It faced government security forces that may 
have numbered up to one hundred and twenty thousand men strong. These forces were 
supplied with hundreds of millions of dollars worth of up-to-date Soviet military 
hardware including bombers and helicopters. In addition, Renamo faced a government 
army reinforced by thousands of Zimbabwean, Tanzanian, Zambian and Malawian 
soldiers and airmen. Perhaps as much as half of the Zimbabwean army and air force, 
one of the best armed forces in Africa, may have been deployed in Mozambique at the 
height of that country's involvement. The Zimbabweans acted much as the Soviet 
army had in Afghanistan in providing backbone to an increasingly demoralised 
Mozambican army. 
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As part of its attempt to explore and explain the military and political advances 
enjoyed, in the face of considerable odds, by Renamo in the 1980s, the study 
suggested several reasons for Renamo' s success. It argued that there were two key 
factors. One was the schism and antagonism between rural and urban Mozambique 
which had existed prior to the civil war. This natural fault line, which had been 
exploited by Frelimo during its guerrilla war against the Portuguese, was clearly 
exacerbated by post-independence Frelimo policies such as forced villagisation, the 
removal of power from traditional chiefs and headmen, and moves against religion 
and traditional rural practices including bride-prices, polygamy and initiation 
ceremonies. The forced relocation of hundreds of thousands of Mozambican peasants 
into state-run communal villages not only dislocated traditional fanning but created 
additional tensions as attempts to collectivise farming failed and resulted in grave 
food shortages. An additional cause of considerable grievance was the government's 
decree that the use of the Portuguese language was to be universalised - this in a 
country where Portuguese was the mother tongue to 1.23 percent of Mozambicans. 
Even Frelimo sympathisers were forced to admit that Frelimo's policies faced the 
"reservoir of cultural resistance of the masses".6 There is no doubt that Renamo was 
able to exploit this "cultural resistance" and that the overwhelming majority of its 
soldiers, recruited from the rural population, would have had first-hand experience of 
government attempts to impose a new order on their communities. 
My book further documented the fact that the urban-rural schism was in tum 
accentuated by clear regional tensions. Both Frelimo, and Mozambique's post-
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independence governments, had tended to be dominated by Mozambicans from the 
south of the country. Mozambique's two Presidents had come from one particular area 
in southern Mozambique. Additionally, many white, mestir;o and Indian members of 
Frelimo were disproportionately prominent in the government of the country, further 
alienating many black Mozambicans. The capital of Mozambique, Maputo, was 
situated in the deep south. This gave rise to the sort of regional tensions that one sees 
in many countries throughout the world - tensions that are always exacerbated in time 
of conflict. In addition to having a social constituency amongst many of 
Mozambique's rural population, Renamo also came to be the focus for some of the 
regional alienation that resulted from perceptions of Frelimo as a party essentially of 
the south and non-Africans. Renamo had originally become active in the late 1970s in 
Manica and Sofala province in central Mozambique, and rapidly expanded into other 
provinces, including the most populous Zambezia and Nampula provinces in northern 
Mozambique. 
The extent of Renamo's physical presence had always been a matter of considerable 
debate and disinformation. The study drew together the often-stated claims of the 
Frelimo government, repeated by various external commentators, that Renamo did not 
enjoy any level of popular support amongst the Mozambican population, and did not 
geographically hold any significant areas of Mozambique.7 These two claims were 
central to the standard projection of Renamo. These claims were extensively 
contradicted by those journalists and commentators mentioned separately below who 
had visited Renamo controlled parts of Mozambique. They all confirmed both popular 
support and control of large areas of Mozambique. Additionally, the United Nations, 
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as part of its role of supervising both transitional period and the election which 
followed, confinned that Renamo either administered or controlled significant areas 
within 54 of Mozambique's 120 districts. Of these many were vast in size, and 
altogether they represented a major part of Mozambique. The UN did not include 
Renamo-held districts in Mozambique's northern-most Niassa province. 
It is also clear that the South Africa government was itself probably unaware of the 
extent of the support for Renamo in Mozambique. It would appear that Pretoria 
genuinely believed, along with the Mozambican government, that the ending of its 
assistance to Renamo would mean the end of the organisation and its anned struggle 
in Mozambique. The opposite turned out to be the case. 
Renamo and the Role of External Support 
The standard Frelimo characterisation of Renamo was that it was nothing more and 
nothing less than a creation of the Rhodesian and South African governments. This 
perspective pointed out that the Resistencia Nacional Mor;ambicana was fonned in 
Rhodesia in 1976, and that from then, until the white-dominated regime was replaced 
by the government of Robert Mugabe, Renamo received military assistance from the 
Rhodesian government. This military assistance was then carried on from 1980 until 
1985 by the government of South Africa. 
My study pointed out, however, that there were clear contradictions within the claims 
made by Frelimo with regard to its Rhodesian genesis. Much is made by academics 
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and others of statements by Ken Flower, the head of the Rhodesian secret service, in 
his autobiography Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record. Rhodesia 
into Zimbabwe 1964 to 1981, that Rhodesia had indeed been instrumental in 
bringing Renamo into being. 8 A closer study of the references to Mozambique 
revealed that several statements in Flower's autobiography, and particularly in an 
appendix which was said to be a copy of secret Rhodesian document written in 1974 
entitled "Flechas and the Formation of the Mozambican National Resistance", are 
factually and chronologically untrue. This document, for example, would have dated 
Renamo to 1974, when it is clear that it came into being in 1976. Moreover, in an 
1987 interview Flower stated that the assistance afforded to Renamo by the Rhodesian 
government was limited and that some two or three, and at the very most five, of his 
men were ever involved with the organisation. This assistance was then contrasted 
with the several hundred Chinese and Soviet bloc military and security personnel who 
were responsible for training Frelimo personnel in its Tanzanian base camps during 
Frelimo's war against the Portuguese, when Frelimo was a guerrilla movement. I also 
pointed out that Frelimo was itself formed outside of Mozambique, in Dar-es-Salaam, 
the capital of Tanzania. 
It is clear that Renamo did receive military assistance from South Africa from 1980 
until 1984. In 1984 the South African and Mozambican governments signed the 
Nkomati accord. This accord secured a number of South Africa's regional and 
security concerns, and was signed from a South African position of strength. South 
African assistance to Renamo ended almost immediately. My study attempted to put 
South African assistance to Renamo in context by comparing the assistance afforded 
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to Renamo with the massive assistance given to the anti-government UNITA guerrilla 
movement in Angola. Clearly perceived as a much more strategic issue, South Africa 
had intervened militarily at brigade-strength from time to time and had supplied 
UNITA with vast quantities of weapons and logistical support. Pretoria's assistance to 
Renamo paied into insignificance by comparison, and even this support was ended 
when it became politically expedient for the South Africans to do so. 
The book also documented claims by the Frelimo government at various stages that 
Renamo was receiving assistance from the Israeli, Kenyan, Malawian, Portuguese, 
Moroccan and American governments. 
Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment also introduced 
an interesting legal perspective on the issue of whether Renamo was a Mozambican 
organisation engaged in a popular uprising against the Frelimo government or whether 
it was nothing more than a South African puppet. The Commercial Court in London 
was called upon to give a ruling on a sizeable insurance claim relating to 
Mozambique. Between July 1982 and January 1983, the Beira to Feruka oil pipeline 
in Mozambique had been attacked on several occasions. A number of oil tank 
installations in Beira had also been destroyed. These attacks had been carried out by 
Renamo forces. The oil stocks had belonged to Zimbabwean-based oil companies who 
claimed on their insurance policies. Lloyds of London, the underwriters, refused the 
claim, citing policy clauses that excluded coverage if losses were incurred by civil 
war, rebellion or insurrection. The Zimbabwean plaintiffs put forward the standard 
Frelimo perspective that Renamo was a foreign creation without any political 
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objectives or support from the Mozambican people. Their activities did not therefore 
comprise civil war, rebellion or insurrection. Mr Justice Saville's judgement was in 
favour of Lloyds. Mr Justice Saville's judgement commented on the fact that 
propaganda had led to true positions being obscured, concealed and misrepresented. 
He found that despite any Rhodesian or South African involvement, Renamo was a 
Mozambican movement with at least some level of support from Mozambicans. 
Independent Visitors to Renamo Areas in Mozambique 
In attempting to present a picture of those parts of Mozambique held by Renamo 
during the civil war, the study documented, for the first time in one work, the 
impressions and comments of those independent observers who had visited Renamo-
administered areas of Mozambique during the civil war, and before the 1994 election. 
It also recorded the comments of foreign observers who had been detained while in 
these areas. Amongst these visitors were Sharon Behn, the Lisbon correspondent of 
the Independent newspaper, correspondents from Jane's Defence Weekly, Holger 
Jensen of the Washington Times, ITN's foreign correspondents Michael Nicholson 
and Jeremy Thompson, Lord Michael Cecil of the Sunday Times, Italian journalist 
Amerigo Grucce, German television producer Dittmar Hack, French journalist Dr Eric 
Gerard and Portuguese telejournalist Rui Paulo da Cruz, all of whom visited Renamo 
areas at various times during the conflict, and all of whom produced written or 
television accounts of their impressions. They all challenged standard perceptions of 
Renamo. 
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Of even more interest and value was the study's documenting of the impressions of 
those individuals who had been detained by Renamo. These included British 
journalist Nicholas Della Casa, who was held for eighteen months as a suspected spy, 
Kindra Bryan, an American missionary nurse who together with several other 
missionaries was detained by Renamo and spent three months with the organisation; 
and Ian Robertson, a British agricultural worker whose agricultural scheme was 
attacked by Renamo, and who spent over 6 weeks with Renamo. As former captives 
of Renamo they were perhaps the most independent of the sources that could have 
been presented. They were also significant as had all been moved around vast tracts of 
Renamo-held areas of Mozambique, in some cases from one end of Mozambique to 
another. They covered thousands of kilometres. All three of these detainees, along 
with several others held for periods of time by Renamo, had, when released, positive 
things to say about Renamo, the extent of Renamo's control over rural Mozambique, 
and Renamo's relationship with the population it came into contact with. And, unlike 
refugees in Mozambique, or in government-controlled camps in neighbouring 
countries, these witnesses had the freedom to speak their mind. One American 
journalist, William Finnegan, actually records his annoyance with the fact that an 
Italian priest he interviewed, who had been held for forty days, and who had travelled 
hundreds of kilometres with Renamo, refused to demonise his captors. 9 
These and other observers also noted at least rudimentary Renamo administrative 
structures in place. 
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Academia, Frelimo and the Mozambican Civil War 
Most of the academic works which came to be accepted as standard texts on the 
history and political development of Mozambique, and particularly the period of its 
history between the mid-1970s and the 1990s, tended to present what could best at 
best be described as an imperfect picture of events within that country, especially with 
regard to the Resistencia Nacional MOt;ambicana. 
Much of the post-1975 literature on Mozambique, and on the subsequent civil war 
between the Frelimo government and Renamo which unfolded from 1975 onwards, 
was dominated by what can best be termed the cooperante school. \0 Cooperantes were 
defined by Frelimo leader Samora Machel as "militants who share a common 
cause .. .in order to help with national reconstruction". Another definition was that of 
Gillian Walt, a British health policy lecturer, and herself a cooperante, who stated that 
cooperantes are "skilled workers who were politically sympathetic to the aims of the 
Mozambican government". Frelimo was seen as a party of the left, and most 
cooperantes were motivated by an ideological affinity to Frelimo's Marxism. This 
school was therefore made up of political sympathisers, many of whom had either 
actively worked with Frelimo during the years of its struggle against the Portuguese or 
those who had worked within the emergent Frelimo state for several years. These 
were people for whom Frelimo in struggle and in power within Mozambique 
represented a utopian socialist movement and state, and for whom the Portuguese 
were colonial imperialists. In Political Pilgrims 11, Paul Hollander's study of socialist 
idealists who visited the Soviet Union at the height of the excesses in that country and 
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returned praising the system, Mozambique was cited as a latter-day equivalent among 
radical Western intellectuals. 12 For these "political pilgrims" Renamo was nothing 
more than a reactionary South African surrogate devoid of any resonance within the 
Mozambican population. This school shaped a considerable amount of what were 
generally accepted as the definitive texts on Mozambique, the development and 
struggle of the Frente de Liberta9QO de M09ambique for independence from the 
Portuguese and the resulting conflict with the Resistencia Nacional M09ambicana. 
Typical of this school was Professor Allen Isaacman and his A Luta Continua: 
Creating a New Society in Mozambique (1978) followed by his 1983 work, co-
authored with his wife, Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution. \3 Both had 
worked for Frelimo in Mozambique after independence, lecturing at Eduardo 
Mondlane University, and were subsequently very active in pro-Frelimo solidarity 
work in the United States. Equally typical was Professor Barry Munslow's 
Mozambique: the Revolution and its Origins. 14 Munslow taught at Liverpool and 
Manchester University, and had also taught at the Eduardo Mondlane University. 
Bertil Egero's Mozambique: A Dream Undone; The Political Economy of 
Democracy, was published in 1987.15 Egero had associated with Frelimo in the 
1960s, and worked as a cooperante from 1978-80, There is in some cases a certain 
continuity between writing on the two insurgencies. Several writers on Mozambique 
had already written extensively during the war of independence. North American 
academics John Saul and Professor William Minter, for example, both had pro-
Frelimo work published in the early 1970s: Minter's Portuguese Africa and the 
West in 1972, and Saul's "Frelimo a,nd the Mozambique Revolution" in Essays on 
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the Political Economy of Africa in 1973. Both Minter and Saul had lived in 
Tanzania in the 1960s and had worked with FRELIMO. Minter, for example, lectured 
in the FRELIMO political school in Tanzania in the 1960s. Saul subsequently edited 
A Difficult Road: The Transition to Socialism in Mozambique in 1985. Saul was 
candid enough to state that for scholars such as himself academic preoccupations are 
shaped by the ongoing process of ideological class struggle. Minter produced the 1989 
report, The Mozambican National Resistance (Renamo) as Described by Ex-
Participants, as well as Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in 
Angola and Mozambique in 1994. 16 Minter received the 'International Combatant 
Star' in 1989 for services to the Frelimo party. 
Dr Joseph Hanlon's 1984 book, Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire, while 
touching on a number of Frelimo mistakes, still took the then orthodox line denying 
Renamo's Mozambican identity.17 Many Non-Governmental Organisations and their 
staff members had close links with the Mozambican government, many having 
worked as cooperantes. Ian Bray, for example, wrote Chicualacuala: Life on the 
Frontline, published by Oxfam in 1987. Bray had been Oxfam's assistant field 
director in Mozambique 1985-86. He had worked for the Mozambican government 
before working for Oxfam and was subsequently associated with both the 
Mozambique Information Office and the Mozambique Angola Committee, the first a 
Mozambican government media outlet, and the latter a pro-Frelimo solidarity group. 
Oxfam also published Julian Quan's Mozambique - A Cry for Peace in 1987: Quan 
subsequently left Oxfam to work for the Mozambican government. Derrick Knight's 
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equally pro-Frelimo study, Mozambique - Caught in the Trap, was published by 
Christian Aid in 1988. 
The cooperante grouping were often bound by rigid class-centred Marxist dogma in 
their analyses. The other two schools of thought were revisionist, one somewhat more 
hesitant than the other. 
A revisionist generation of commentators was led by two French anthropologists. 
Michel Cahen's 1987 study Mozambique: La Revolution Implosee and Christian 
Geffray's La Cause des Armes au Mozambique: Anthropologie d'une Guerre 
Civile, published in 1990, argued that previous perspectives on RENAMO were 
flawed in that they essentially denied the Mozambican nature of the RENAMO 
phenomena. 18 Interestingly, the CaheniGeffray school itself developed out of the 
cooperante grouping. The debate this revision engendered was typified by the 
exchanges in the Southern African Review of Books in 1988-89.19 This revisionism 
was picked up by several other writers such as Dr Tom Young. His 1990 African 
Affairs article "The MNRIRENAMO: external and internal dynamics" was a pivotal 
revision of some of the hitherto generally accepted perspectives on Renamo. 2o Alex 
Vines's Renamo: Terrorism in Mozambique, published in 1991, also took a 
partially revised line on Renamo and the dynamics of the Mozambican civil war. 21 
There was also what can be described as a minority Renamo-sympathetic grouping 
made up of Professor Andre Thomashausen, Sybil Cline and myself. Thomashausen's 
1983 "The National Resistance of Mozambique" in Africa Insight, and his "The 
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Mozambican National Resistance" in Weerstandsbewegings in Suider-Africa, 
published in 1987, constituted the first moves towards presenting an alternative 
viewpoint on Renamo. 22 Sybil Cline's monograph Anti-Communist Insurgents in 
Mozambique: The Fight Goes On in 1989 presented the Renamo case following 
visits to both sides of the conflict by the author. 23 My own Mozambique: A Nation 
in Crisis in 1989 questioned much of what had previously passed for academic and 
media coverage and analysis of Renamo and the circumstances within Mozambique in 
which Renamo had come to the fore. 
Academics and Renamo: No Text to Analyse 
Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment presented the 
first examination of the academic community's failure to get to grips with the Renamo 
phenomenon. This was for several reasons. The study made the point that Frelimo 
exercised a virtual monopoly on the flow of news within Mozambique, and that it 
either controlled or shaped much of the information coming out of Mozambique 
concerning the country and its conflict. Virtually all of the standard texts on 
Mozambique had been written by cooperantes, and others who were either Frelimo 
supporters or clearly Frelimo sympathetic; this in tum meant that any attempt to 
produce a balanced academic study based on the written and published materials 
available would be difficult. Additionally, given the very difficult security situation 
throughout virtually all of Mozambique for most of the civil war, meaningful research 
or field work was impossible. There was, as Michel Cahen stated, simply no text to 
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analyse.24 This clearly did not prevent several attempts, attempts flawed to a greater or 
lesser extent by the author's inability to get to grips in any real sense with Renamo. 
Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment critically 
analysed Alex Vines' Renamo: Terrorism in Mozambique, one of the then 
somewhat more balanced attempts to study Renamo, which was published in 1991 
and presented as the most comprehensive study to date. Vines, however, had produced 
this study without meeting or interviewing any of Renamo's national leaders or 
national council members, or even one member of Renamo in Mozambique. Neither 
had he visited any of the considerable areas within Mozambique controlled by 
Renamo. Nor did Vines interview any of the many, independent, observers who had 
visited these areas and who had met with Renamo leaders and members. Despite 
these, and other serious flaws, Renamo: Terrorism in Mozambique was described 
as "encyclopaedic" by its publishers. The book was riddled with factual errors and 
while accepting the semi-revisionist perspective that Renamo was essentially 
Mozambican in nature, Vines did not break free from the by now standard repetition 
of other Frelimo claims about Renamo. It was disappointing that while conceding 
that "censorship and propaganda" had "obscured" study of the Mozambican conflict, 
there was no attempt to review or assess that propaganda. Poor research resulting in 
stereotyped imagery was ultimately just as limited as studies shaped by ideological 
commitment and fervour. 
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The Mozambican conflict and international media coverage 
Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment also examined 
the projection of a Frelimo perspective through international media outlets. It was the 
case that generally speaking international media reporting on the Mozambican civil 
war reflected Frelimo government positions and carried most Frelimo government 
claims, and generally either did not or were unable to carry any Renamo comment. 
This was for several reasons. All the news agencies, and, with very few exceptions, 
most of those foreign correspondents working in Mozambique, were almost 
exclusively geographically confined to Maputo, the Mozambican capital, or one or 
two other urban areas. Given the pressing need to file news copy, the news agencies 
and journalists would file what news was available to them - mostly material 
originated by the Mozambican state news agency. The study also showed that there 
was also a surprising overlap between those representing international media 
organisations and those actually working for the Mozambican government news 
agencies. lain Christie, for example, doubled as the Reuters correspondent in 
Mozambique from 1980 onwards while also working as a senior Mozambican 
government information official. He had worked for the Mozambican state news 
agency and then headed the English language external service of the state-controlled 
Radio Mozambique. An open political sympathiser, Christie had worked for Fre1imo 
in Tanzania several years prior to Mozambique's independence in 1975. In 1989 he 
was awarded the 'Internationalist Combatant Star', along with William Minter. Paul 
Fauvet was another example of a cooperante who came to hold significant 
international media positions in Mozambique. The Agence France Press bureau in 
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Mozambique was actually listed as care of Radio Mozambique, with Fauvet as the 
bureau chief. Fauvet was also the Maputo correspondent for the Guardian and other 
newspapers. Fauvet was then a member of the Communist Party of Great Britain. 
There is little doubt that both would have qualified as "political pilgrims". Their 
position in Mozambique would have been the equivalent perhaps of Reuters and 
Agence France Presse having as their Moscow correspondents during the Cold War 
period people who worked full-time for Tass, Pravda or Radio Moscow. 
My work further documented that Joseph Hanlon, an unambiguous supporter of 
Frelimo, reported from Mozambique for the BBC from 1979-1985, and wrote on 
Mozambican issues for the Guardian, Observer, Africa Confidential and other 
newspapers. Hanlon's 1984 Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire, clearly 
reflected a Frelimo line on most issues, and particularly Renamo. It is certainly 
significant that, of nine foreign news bureaux listed in Mozambique in 1991, there 
was only one, a Portuguese news organisation, without any obvious ideological or 
employment connections to Mozambican government and its state information 
outlets. In addition, given Zimbabwe's military and political commitment to the 
Frelimo government, the efficient ZIANA news agency reinforced the Mozambican 
government's positions with respect to Renamo and the civil war. 
As part of its study of the role of the international media in reporting on Renamo and 
the Mozambican civil war, Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: A Case for 
Reassessment examined two major news reports which claimed very serious abuses 
of human rights and the law of war by Renamo. Both were subsequently admitted to 
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-be inaccurate. The study also examined the reporting accuracy of one of the few 
independent foreign journalists who was actually based full-time in Mozambique and 
travelled as much as he could around the country during the civil war. 
In mid-1991, the state-owned Noticias newspaper claimed that Renamo had been 
involved in the massacre and mutilation of one thousand Mozambican civilians in and 
around the town of Lalaua in the northern province of Nampula. Although Renamo 
vigorously denied the claims, lain Christie, the Reuters correspondent in 
Mozambique, filed the story and the Reuters report was carried by countless 
newspapers and media outlets around the world. Coverage of the claims as carried in 
the Independent and Guardian in Britain were perhaps typical of the use of the 
Reuters report internationally. They ran articles of 375 and 236 words respectively 
with the Independent's headline reading' Severed heads on shop shelves after Renamo 
massacres 1,000'. Associated Press also ran with the story. Renamo denied the claims. 
It was only after international journalists attempted to do on the spot follow-up 
stories, and demanded to be shown the site, that the facts of the matter eventually 
emerged. Instead of one thousand civilians having been murdered and mutilated, some 
forty-seven pro-government militiamen had died in a clash with Renamo forces. 
Reuters admitted its error some days later, but not before considerable damage had 
once again been done to Renamo's image internationally. Very few, if any, of the 
news outlets which carried the original Reuters report would have bothered to have 
subsequently corrected it. 
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The second example studied involved the Mozambican government's claims that 
Renamo forces had used chemical weapons on its (orces in southern Mozambique in 
January 1992. The Mozambican government claimed that there had been five 
fatalities. Renamo denied the allegation. Given the gravity of the claim, the United 
Nations as well as the South African and British governments conducted detailed 
investigations into the affair. Despite the fact that all three investigations were not 
able to support Frelimo's claims, both the London Times and Le Monde claimed that 
there had been conclusive evidence of Renamo's use of chemical weapons. The Times 
unilaterally increased the number of Frelimo fatalities to fifty, and Le Monde stated 
that eighty soldiers had been killed. The British government, closely allied to the 
Frelimo government and no friend of Renamo's, officially described the Times article 
as "misleading". 
The two instances mentioned above were interesting and informative. They were also 
unusual in that they were sufficiently grave for immediate, and objective, media and 
other attention to be focused upon them and for these allegations against Renamo to 
be found inaccurate. As the vast number of claims and allegations made against 
Renamo by the Frelimo authorities were considerably less high profile, they tended to 
be reported as they appeared on the international news wires or from correspondents 
in Mozambique, without any further investigation or attempts at verification. 
Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment also examined 
the reporting from Mozambique of Karl Maier, who reported from Mozambique for 
the Independent newspaper for several years. Although Maier's work compared well 
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with much of the partisan coverage of the Mozambican conflict, it was nonetheless 
flawed. It still carried as fact many Frelimo claims subsequently seen as at best 
questionable and at worst inaccurate propaganda. It was not only Maier's reporting of 
"facts" that was often questionable. Maier's personal assessments and analysis was 
also often demonstrably flawed. A prime example were his repeated statements that 
Renamo was uncontrollable and undisciplined, and that the Renamo leader Afonso 
Dhlakama would be unable to control his men or observe the 1990 partial cease-fire 
and the 1992 general cease-fire. In the cold light of day, this analysis was 
subsequently proven to be clearly inaccurate. 
The study also looked at Renamo's apparent inability to put its case to the 
international community. It could be said that Renamo simply did not prioritise 
putting its case forward in the media. To an extent it did not care what the outside 
world thought. Additionally, Renamo experienced considerable funding difficulties 
and was unable to adequately fund any media work that it might have wished to have 
seen carried out. Unlike almost any other modem insurgency, Renamo did not have 
rear-bases and support facilities in neighbouring countries during the civil war. Any 
support it may have had from Rhodesia and South Africa was limited and clandestine. 
By contrast, during its guerrilla war against the Portuguese Frelimo was openly 
established in Zambia and Tanzania, where it was publicly represented and from 
where Frelimo ran media offices. Because of these logistical as well as passport 
difficulties, Renamo was forced to rely to act as spokesmen on long-standing, and 
ultimately unsuitable, Mozambican political refugees outside of Mozambique. They 
were very often mired in the personality clashes and internecine strife of exile politics. 
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There came a time, however, when Renamo did realise that the way it was seen 
internationally was hindering a negotiated political settlement of the conflict, and it 
did begin to address, at least in part, the media issue as well as the need to have 
representatives overseas who were trusted by the Renamo leadership. 
Frelimo and international solidarity structures 
At least in large part because of its socialist orientation, Frelimo had from its earliest 
days the advantage of being able, as it were, to "plug" into international solidarity 
structures. Pre-independence familiarity with these international structures, as well as 
organisations such as the United Nations, the Organisation of African Unity 
Liberation Committee, the World Peace Council and Organisation of Solidarity with 
Afro-Asian Peoples, was expanded upon in the years following Frelimo's assumption 
of power in 1975. Through its automatic membership of various international and 
multi-lateral organisations, its various embassies throughout the world, and pro-
Frelimo solidarity groups in various countries, Frelimo intensified its international 
work from 1980 onwards. Given its standard projection that Renamo was a South 
Africa creation, it was able to highlight its perspective on Renamo within many of the 
well-organised anti-apartheid structures that had by then come into being. 
By the late 1980s, for example, the European Campaign Against South African 
Aggression on Mozambique and Angola was able to marshall pro-Frelimo solidarity 
groups in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. There 
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were also very active pro-Frelimo solidarity groups in the United States, Canada and 
Australia. As an example of a national Mozambique solidarity movement in action, 
the study showed that the Mozambique Angola Committee in the United Kingdom 
was in tum active in the Anti-Apartheid Movement, the British Defence and Aid 
Fund, Catholic Fund for Overseas Development, Institute for African Alternatives, the 
National Association of Local Government Officers, and the National Union of 
Railwaymen 'Rail Against Apartheid', all of which ran projects with regard to 
Mozambique that unconditionally reflected Frelimo positions. 
Non-Governmental Organisations and the Mozambican Conflict. 
The work submitted also touched on the positions taken by the many non-
governmental organisations that were active in Mozambique during the civil war. 
Some of the written work originated by authors who worked for non-governmental 
organisations in Mozambique has already been mentioned. Mozambique, Resistance 
and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment documented some of the very close links 
between several internationally-reputable non-governmental organisations and the 
Mozambican government and Frelimo party. A large number of workers had worked 
for both the Mozambican government and non-governmental organisations at 
different times. Even if there was no political affinity between many of the expatriates 
who worked for international non-governmental organisations, their scope for 
accurately assessing the situation throughout most of the country was very limited. 
They only worked in those areas of Mozambique under government control, mainly in 
or about major urban areas. The non-governmental organisations and their staff were 
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reliant on the good-will of the government to carry out their work in Mozambique, 
and many held contracts from foreign governments and international bodies to work 
or provide services in Mozambique. These were contingent on Mozambican 
government approval. As was outlined in my book, for whatever reason, several key 
international non-governmental organisations, many of whom had significant access 
to the governments in the Western countries, were yet another platform for standard 
Mozambican government projections about Renamo. Several were vocal in attributing 
responsibility for the violence in Mozambique to the South African government, 
asserting that Renamo was a terrorist organisation and a South African surrogate 
force, as well as presenting Frelimo's politics in a positive light. 
The study examined, for example, the work of Dr Ken Wilson, a noted refugee 
researcher associated with Queen Elizabeth House at the University of Oxford. Dr 
Wilson could not be described as a cooperante, and clearly stated that he saw himself 
as an independent resea:-cher. Dr Wilson produced several publications which echoed 
essentially second or third-hand accounts of Renamo, claiming that Renamo was a 
brutal and coercive organisation and that life in Renamo-held areas was punitive. 
While not doubting Dr Wilson's integrity, my book did challenge his claim to be 
independent. The simple fact was that he had never visited any of the Renamo-held 
areas about which he spoke and wrote so definitively. His research had been in 
Frelimo-controlled areas of Mozambique and in refugee camps in Malawi and 
Zambia. He recognised the assistance of the Mozambican, Malawian and Zambian 
governments - all of which were at war with Renamo. His studies were funded by 
non-governmental organisations such as Oxfam and Christian Aid, agencies 
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implacably hostile to Renamo given their close association with the Mozambican 
government. Dr Wilson had also done work for the Mozambican government. The 
fact that Dr Wilson, and researchers like him, however sincere they may have been, 
were simply unable to independently assess the situation in Renamo areas called into 
question the credibility and reliability of their published work on the Mozambican 
conflict, Renamo and Renamo-held areas. Also undermining their credibility was the 
fact that they often relied upon flawed and questionable sources in the absence of any 
first-hand field work. 
Human rights Commentators and the Mozambican Conflict 
The study carefully analysed what became known as the Gersony report. Published in 
April 1988, the Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally 
Conflict-Related Experience in Mozambique had been commissioned by the 
American State Department and prepared by Robert Gersony, a consultant to the State 
Department's Bureau for Refugee Programs. Simply put, Gersony interviewed one 
hundred and ninety-six refugees and displaced persons in twenty-five refugee camps 
in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Malawi and South Africa, ten of which were in 
Mozambique. From these interviews Gersony extrapolated that Renamo had been 
responsible for the deaths of one hundred thousand civilians. Only three percent of 
complaints concerned Frelimo. Faultlines in the report were immediately evident. 
Gersony never at any stage visited any of the Renamo-held areas of Mozambique in 
which these extrapolated deaths were said to have taken place. Gersony was 
unfamiliar with Portuguese or any of the local Mozambican languages and dialects. 
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He had to work with local translators. In some of the countries government officials 
actually sat in on the interviews. Amongst the other drawbacks in his work, Gersony 
admitted that the majority of those interviewed could not count accurately above the 
number ten. Several other commentators on Mozambican affairs during the civil war 
commented on the simple unreliability of refugee interviews. Gersony's claims were 
further contrasted with the work submitted by several other sources such as Vines, 
Agence France Presse, the Indian Ocean Newsletter and even Christian Aid, sources 
which stated that there was considerable pro-Renamo sentiment in many refugee 
camps. Perhaps the most significant point made in respect of the Gersony report was 
that it was commissioned and produced by the American government which, at that 
time and right up until the Mozambican peace and election process, was implacably 
hostile to Renamo. There is no doubt whatsoever that the Gersony report suited clear 
and identifiable American foreign policy towards Mozambique, whose government 
Washington was actively politically and militarily supporting, in serving to further 
demonise Renamo. 
Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment compared the 
Gersony report to the infamous Bryce Report in 1915. A noted historian and diplomat, 
Lord Bryce chaired a committee which was tasked with compiling Belgian refugee 
accounts of German atrocities and mistreatment of civilians in Belgium. Allegedly 
based on 1,200 depositions, and presented in the form of a legal document, and 
published by the British government's propaganda co-ordinating body, the Bryce 
report was the origin of most of the First World War atrocity stories regarding 
German soldiers bayoneting children, and cutting off of children's hands and 
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women's breasts. Significantly, a Belgian commission of enquiry in 1922 was unable 
to corroborate a single major Bryce report allegation. 
The Gersony report does not really qualify as a human rights report. There were other 
publications which did present themselves as human rights studies. Many of the same 
limitations on accuracy and material that applied to academics and the international 
media, however, also applied to those who sought to document and assess the human 
rights situation during the Mozambican civil war. In some instances it was the same 
people responsible for academic, media and "human rights" work. 
One example studied in this submission was Conspicuous Destruction: War, 
Famine and the Reform Process in Mozambique, published in 1992 by Africa 
Watch, a division of Human Rights Watch. The authors were Karl Maier and Alex 
Vines. The report was a typical example of material that had been broadly accepted as 
"objective" with regard to the Mozambican conflict, but which when examined in 
some detail proved to be grievously flawed. The report restated standard perceptions 
of the Mozambican conflict, the Frelimo government and Renamo. It relied on 
questionable sources and methodology. The difficulties for anyone writing on human 
rights to obtain accurate, reliable and objective material within a war situation are 
immense. And these were difficulties which the authors of the report were seemingly 
unable to overcome. Amongst the sources for material in this Africa Watch report 
were works by Hanlon, Munslow, Allen and Barbara Isaacman, lain Christie, Julian 
Quan, and Derrick Knight. Hanlon was cited twenty-two times. Several of Africa 
Watch's sources had been decorated by the Frelimo government for services to the 
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Frelimo party. There are fifty citations of material produced by explicitly pro-Frelimo 
sources. Mozambican government and government-controlled media sources are cited 
on 37 further occasions. Maier and Vines also cite themselves fourteen times. Renamo 
is only cited as a source ten times. Once again, neither of the authors, nor any of those 
non-Renamo sources cited, had ever visited any of the extensive Renamo-held areas 
of Mozambique. Similarly, none of those independent observers and journalists who 
had visited these Renamo areas, or even those people such as Ian Robertson, Kindra 
Bryan or Nicholas Della Casa, all of whose human rights had in effect been violated 
by Renamo detaining them, were even mentioned let alone cited. 
Even in presenting material alleged to be interviews with Mozambican civilians, the 
report did not present or explain the methodology used. In a sense this human rights 
report was exactly what it was, a report written by a journalist and an academic, and 
as such reflected many of the flaws that had come to dominate media and academic 
coverage of the Mozambican conflict and particularly Renamo. This lack of sound 
methodology led to glaring contradictions within the report. My book documented, for 
example, that, while the report was unwilling to accept allegations that thousands of 
Mozambicans had been killed in the weeks, months and years following Frelimo's 
consolidation of power in Mozambique, because there were no lists of names, the 
report in almost the same breath uncritically and unreservedly accepted the Gersony 
report's statistical extrapolation that Renamo was somehow responsible for one 
hundred thousand deaths. The report also did not make any mention of the quite 
extensive and systematic violations of human rights in Mozambique by the 
Zimbabwean military in their war against Renamo. And this despite the fact that both 
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Africa Watch and Vines himself had previously documented significant examples of 
such abuses. 
The Peace Process 
Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment examined the 
reform and peace process in Mozambique as it gradually unfolded. Having painted 
itself into a comer by denying the existence of any legitimate political opposition to 
its one-party state, towards the late 1980s Frelimo began to seek avenues of securing a 
negotiated settlement to the civil war. This shift was largely the result of a worsening 
military situation for Mozambican government forces. Unable to be seen to negotiate 
with an enemy it had for so long demonised, it was Mozambican church groups that 
initiated the first contact with the Resistencia Nacional Mo(:ambicana in August 1989. 
The Zimbabwean and Kenyan heads of state were approached by Frelimo to serve as 
mediators. They, together with church groups, recommended face-to-face negotiations 
between the two sides. These meetings came to be held in the Vatican, at the St 
Egideo community, and were assisted by the Italian government. Five months of 
negotiations resulted in the 1990 partial ceasefire agreement whereby Zimbabwean 
forces were withdrawn to specified corridors inside Mozambique. In August 1992 the 
Mozambican general peace agreement saw the end of the Mozambican civil war. A 
United Nations-supervised transitional period, followed by internationally-monitored 
multi-party elections in late October 1994. 
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The 1994 Election Results 
The results of the internationally-supervised multi-party elections held in September 
1994 served as a vindication for several of the assertions made in my study. In the 
Parliamentary elections Fre1imo secured 44.33 percent of the national vote. Renamo 
polled 37.78 percent of the vote, less than seven percentage points behind Frelimo. 
Frelimo returned 129 members of the 250 member legislature, and Renamo 112. The 
breakdown of the vote provincially was also interesting. Renamo won in five of 
Mozambique's ten provinces (Maputo city itself constitutes a separate province with 
Maputo province). Mozambique's most populous provinces of Nampula and 
Zambezia were amongst the five provinces won by Renamo. The election 
demonstrated clear Renamo majorities in the midlands and north of Mozambique. 
Frelimo did very well in Mozambique's three southern provinces, and won majorities 
in Mozambique's two most northern provinces. In the Presidential elections, the 
incumbent Frelimo President, Joaquin Chissano, won 53.30 percent of the vote to 
Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama's 33.73 percent. The election result came as a 
surprise to many outside commentators. 
Conclusion 
In challenging the generally-accepted image of the Resistencia Nacional 
Mot;ambicana, Mozambique, Resistance and Freedom: A Case for Reassessment 
was instrumental in attempting to present a clearer picture of the dynamics, issues and 
participants within the Mozambican civil war, which had been one of Africa's longest 
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running conflicts. It also presented a case study of an information war in a time of 
intense military conflict. 
My work provided for the first time a history of Renamo which traced Renamo's 
claim to be a genuine Mozambican nationalist party, a party which claimed to be the 
heir to the original philosophy of Frelimo itself. It examined the history of 
Mozambican nationalism in the 1960s and into the 1970s. In exploring the view that 
Renamo had in effect emerged out of Frelimo, the study also examined the social 
dynamics which were reflected both in the physical makeup of Renamo membership 
and in the grass-roots support it enjoyed in significantly large geographical areas of 
Mozambique. 
The study also examined, for the first time, the nature of the information war fought 
within the Mozambican civil war, a war in which one side, Renamo, did not really 
participate, and which therefore projected to the outside world an almost exclusively 
Frelimo perspective of circumstances and events inside Mozambique. It was 
undoubtedly significant that a vast amount of the media and academic coverage of the 
Mozambican civil war, and the political situation in the country at the time, was 
written by "political pilgrims" ideologically committed to the Frelimo party and 
government. In this respect the study is useful and can be used to assess similar 
examples of a one-sided projections of circumstances and events within a civil war. 
Events in Sierra Leone, I believe, may present a similar example of such 
circumstances. 
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I believe that academic scholarship failed in its assessment and analysis of the 
Mozambican conflict. Academic coverage of the Mozambican civil war, and 
particularly Renamo, was almost universally poor. This was at least partly explained 
by the fact that the field of Mozambican studies was dominated, at least from 
independence into the late 1980s, by writers who were often unconditional political 
supporters of Frelimo. There was also a related obvious disinclination by many 
academics and writers to challenge the "accepted wisdom" with regard to the conflict 
and Renamo. There were also, of course, the clear and immovable difficulties of 
conducting any meaningful field studies or research within Mozambique itself. 
The study was also alone in its exploration of how the Mozambican civil war was 
prolonged by the propaganda imagery originated and projected internationally by the 
Frelimo government and its various media, academic and "solidarity" outlets. This 
served to internationally insulate the Frelimo government from reality - that is to say 
the need for a politically negotiated settlement of the conflict. There was also in any 
case the danger, as articulated by one of leading academics on Mozambique, that 
Frelimo had a capacity for believing its own propaganda. The danger of demonising 
one's opposition to the extent of then making it very difficult to then seek to reach an 
accommodation with that enemy was clearly illustrated in this study of the 
Mozambican civil war. This demonisation resulted in sections of the international 
community, often thousands of miles away from the reality of the situation in 
Mozambique, reliant on exclusively Frelimo and Frelimo-related sources for their 
picture of events in Mozambique, often being the most vigorously opposed to any sort 
of reconciliation or political settlement with Renamo. At the end of the day, Frelimo 
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may well have had a more realistic view, both of the strength and popularity of 
Renamo, as well as the worsening security situation the government was facing, but it 
was then difficult for Frelimo to admit any such exaggeration or misinformation on its 
part. Frelimo had in effect painted itself into a comer. There is little doubt that the war 
was prolonged while Frelimo sought ways of manoeuvring its way out of this position 
and towards a peace settlement - a process that was not, at least originally, terribly 
well received by Frelimo's international supporters. 
The work submitted presents a picture of the extraordinary and ultimately incestuous 
overlap between Frelimo sympathisers, cooperantes, Frelimo government employees, 
journalists, non-governmental organisation workers, and academics with regard to 
how the Mozambican civil war and Renamo were projected and generally seen 
internationally. This overlap greatly contributed to a systematic misreading of the 
Mozambican conflict and its participants. This in tum contributed to faulty 
assessments which led to questionable policy towards Mozambique and Renamo by 
several influential Western governments. And ultimately this may have again resulted 
in the war being prolonged. 
The position outlined in the submitted work, that Renamo's support and constituency 
within Mozambique was based to a considerable extent on regional concerns about the 
domination of Frelimo and the Mozambican government by "southerners" was also 
born out in the mUlti-party election that followed in Mozambique some months after 
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